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A Spanish Genocide?
Reflections on the Francoist
Repression after the Spanish
Civil War
J U L I U S R U I Z
To many non-Spaniards, awareness of Nationalist political violence is at best restricted
to a number of specific figures or events during the Spanish Civil War. Remembered
perhaps is the murder of the poet and homosexual Frederico Garcı´a Lorca in Granada,
the crazed speeches given on Radio Seville in the summer of 1936 by Queipo de
Llano and the massacre of Republican militiamen in the Badajoz bullring in August
1936. On the other hand, the consequences of Franco’s unconditional victory in
the civil war have been almost completely overshadowed by the greater cataclysms
of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Thanks partly no doubt to George
Orwell, the elimination of the anti-Stalinist Portido Obrero de Unificacion Marxisto
(POUM) after May 1937 is better known than the more extensive subsequent
Francoist repression in Catalonia.1
Yet the Francoist repression after the civil war should not be forgotten. Recent
research has shown what the consequences of Franco’s unconditional victory in the
civil war were for defeated Republicans. Although a Francoist general, Ramo´n Salas
Larraza´bal, claimed in 1977 that there were no more than 22,716 executions, local
studies indicate a figure of approximately 50,000.2 It is also likely that the number of
inmates in Francoist jails by November 1940 exceeds the 280,000 figure admitted by
the regime in 1946.3 The sheer scale of the repression after March 1939 is emphasised
if it is placed in the wider European context. Repression by other dictatorships in
1 The suppression of the POUM in 1937 led to around sixty executions; there were 3,905 Francoist
executions in Catalonia. Santos Julia´ Dı´az, ed., Victimas de la guerra civil (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999),
341, 411.
2 Ramo´n Salas Larraza´bal, Pe´rdidas de la guerra (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), 390–1. The current estimate
can be found in Julia´n Casanova et al., Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco (Barcelona:
Crı´tica, 2004), 8.
3 The public admission was made in Ministerio de Justicia, Breve resumen de la obra del Ministerio de
Justicia por la pacificacio´n espiritual de Espan˜a (Madrid, 1946). The veracity of the 280,000 figure has been
questioned by, among others, Ricard Vinyes in ‘El universo penitenciario durante el franquismo’, in
Carme Molinero et al. Una inmensa prisio´n (Barcelona: Crı´tica, 2003), 157–60.
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Europe was more selective. The Salazar dictatorship in Portugal convicted ‘only’
18,714 people for political offences between 1932 and 1948.4 Special courts created
under the 1926 State Defence Law in Fascist Italy to punish ‘anti-national’ political
activity issued 3,596 sentences between 1927 and 1939.5 It even appears that no less
a figure than Reichsfu¨hrer SS Heinrich Himmler, on a visit to Spain in October 1940,
was shocked by the scale of the repression and advised that Franco would be better
served incorporating workers rather than punishing them.6 Yet the Spanish dictator
was not interested in Nazi dreams of a Volksgemeinschaft. Rather, he was determined
to punish Republicans for resistance during the civil war. Reconciliation was out of
question; as Franco declared in his first postwar New Year speech after the civil war,
punishment was justified because the Republic had caused ‘so much damage to the
Patria [and] such devastation within families’.7
Franco, in other words, placed the responsibility for the civil war in Republican
hands. This reflected the basic underlying assumption of the post-civil war repres-
sion – the extraordinary notion that the Nationalists, not the legally elected
Republican government, represented the legitimate authority in Spain from July
1936. This was encapsulated in the declaration of martial law by the rebel military
National Defence Council ( Junta de Defensa Nacional) in Burgos on 28 July 1936.
This proclamation was deemed to apply not only in those areas where the rising
had triumphed but also throughout the whole of Spain. It specifically warned that
any resistance to Nationalist – later Francoist – forces would be punished by military
tribunals for the crime of ‘military rebellion’.8
This would turn out to be no idle threat. By the end of the civil war in 1939,
military courts were the central feature of Francoist justice in the Nationalist zone.
Immediately following the occupation of Barcelona on 26 January 1939, for example,
the military authorities declared martial law on the same basis as the original July
1936 decree.9 The first military investigation in the Catalan capital was against nine
prominent officers of Catalonia’s pre-war Civil Guard, including its then commander
General Aranguren, who stayed loyal to the Republic in July 1936. Only one escaped
the firing squad for the crime of ‘military rebellion’.10
Franco’s unconditional victory in the civil war would see not the derogation but the
extension of military justice to the remnants of Republican Spain. Martial law would
remain in force until April 1948.11 Military tribunals were therefore the primary
4 Presos politicos no regime fascista, vol. 4, 1946–1948 (Lisbon, 1981), 415–26, quoted by Polymeris Voglis,
Becoming a Subject: Political Prisoners during the Greek Civil War (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), 22.
5 Doug Thompson, State Control in Fascist Italy: Culture and Conformity, 1925–43 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1991), 35–6.
6 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 392.
7 ABC, 2 Jan. 1940. All translations are by the author.
8 Bolet´ın Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional (hereafter BOJDN ), 30 July 1936.
9 La Vanguardia Espan˜ola, 27 Jan. 1939.
10 Manel Risques, ‘L’execucio´ del general Aranguren Abril de 1939’, in Manel Risques et al., Les
ruptures de l’any 1939 (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2000), 153–69.
11 Manuel Ballbe´, Orden pu´blico y militarismo en la Espan˜a constitucional (1812–1983) (Madrid: Alianza
Editorial, 1983), 409.
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mechanism by which Republicans were punished in the period after March 1939.
In examining this aspect of the repression in his memoirs written in 1977, Ramo´n
Serrano Sun˜er, Franco’s brother-in-law and ex-Interior Minister at the end of the
civil war, admitted that the punishment of Republicans for the crime of military
rebellion was ‘absurd’; it was ‘justicia al reve´s’, or ‘justice turned on its head’.12
While this is the best description we possess of the reality of Francoist justice
after the civil war, it is not what Serrano Sun˜er believed at the time. Indeed, he was
responsible in December 1938 for the appointment of a special commission charged
with the task of demonstrating the legality of the 1936 military rebellion.13 The
composition of this body reflected the importance of its task; among those selected
were fifteen former parliamentary deputies and ten former ministers from pre-1936
right-wing governments. Unsurprisingly, when it reported in February 1939, barely
two months later, it concluded that the military rising of July 1936 ‘cannot in any
sense be defined as rebellion’; the Republican government was ‘fundamentally and
strictly illegitimate’.14
This report laid bare the ideological assumptions of justicia al reve´s. Central was the
notion that Republican and Popular Front organisations were essentially ‘criminal’
and ‘anti-national’. The 1932 Catalan statute of autonomy was the ‘denial of all
national history’. The revolutionary insurrection of October 1934 was a criminal
attempt to ‘dissolve’ Spain. The military rebellion of 18 July 1936 was depicted as a
movement that not only ‘restored’ the rule of law but ‘saved Spain and maybe Human
[sic] civilisation’ from ‘imminent’ Communist revolution. It was contrasted with the
Republican government, which was not only held responsible for the ‘anarchy’ of the
Republican zone in the summer of 1936 but also for the murders of ‘over 500,000’
Spaniards.15
The commission also defended the right of the military to ‘save’ the Patria. It
acted in July 1936 ‘at the service of the legitimate national interests’.16 Such an
argument was hardly novel; it reflected the existence of a long-standing tradition of
army intervention in civilian affairs. When the military rebels declared martial law
in July 1936 they spoke in terms of carrying out ‘their duty’.17 Doubtless they had
in mind other rebellions – or pronunciamientos – when the military had overthrown
12 Ramo´n Serrano Sun˜er, Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la Historia como fue. Memorias (Barcelona:
Planeta, 1977), 245.
13 Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado (hereafter BOE), 22 Dec. 1938.
14 Estado Espan˜ol, Dictamen de la Comisio´n sobre ilegitimidad de poderes actuantes en 18 de julio de 1936
(Barcelona: Editora Nacional, 1939), 104.
15 Ibid., 19, 24, 28–29, 69–75, 77–102. Although space does not permit a detailed rebuttal of these
claims, it is important at least to note that the Republican government repeatedly condemned the murders
carried out in the Republican zone during the civil war. Indeed, its failure to prevent such killings was a
direct consequence of the collapse of state authority following the partial failure of the military rebellion.
When state authority was restored in the winter of 1936–7, arbitrary executions, which did not exceed
50,000, largely came to an end. On this see Julia´, Victimas.
16 Estado Espan˜ol, Dictamen, 65.
17 BOJDN , 30 July 1936.
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a government if the interests of the ‘nation’ had allegedly been at stake.18 They
could also point to the fact that before 1936 military tribunals had regularly punished
civilians for public disorder offences.19 Above all, they could refer to Article 2 of the
army’s own Constitutive Law of 1878, which stated that its primary purpose was ‘the
defence of the Patria against external and internal enemies’.20
Conflation of the state with the ‘nation’ and political opposition with criminality
was not confined to the Franco regime in the 1930s and 1940s.21 But other right-
wing dictatorships of the period were not forced to establish their authority in a
prolonged, fratricidal civil war following a failed military coup. Indeed, the scale of
the post-civil war repression is to a great degree explained by the Franco regime’s
denial that its legitimacy was in fact based on force of arms. Given the Francoist
inversion of legality, anyone in the Republican zone during the civil war could have
committed a potentially criminal act of ‘rebellion’. As Eugenio Ferna´ndez Asiaı´n, a
military prosecutor in Bilbao, San Sebastia´n and Badajoz, put it in 1943, ‘the defence
of the old [Republican] political order constituted the true rebellion’.22
The determination to punish ‘red criminality’ was not the product of the civil war.
The director of the military rebellion of July 1936, General Mola, had emphasised
in his very first directive to his fellow military plotters in May that a period of
‘exemplary violence’ against Popular Front supporters would be required to ensure
the success of the rising.23 Many historians have taken Mola’s instructions as evidence
of a plan of extermination that was carried out in Nationalist Spain after July 1936
against supporters of the Republic. Alberto Reig Tapia, in a discussion on Nationalist
‘extermination policy’, stresses that the ‘repression was planned as demonstrated by
the instructions and declarations of General Mola [before the civil war]’.24 In a similar
vain, Francisco Espinosa’s recent examination of the objectives of the military rebels
in 1936 was entitled ‘July 1936. Military coup and the plan of extermination’.25 The
post-civil war repression has often therefore been regarded as the logical culmination
of this ‘plan’. AsMichael Richards puts it, the policy of ‘physical extermination . . . did
not cease with Franco’s declaration of the end of the Civil War’; he warns against the
‘intellectual laziness’ of attributing Francoist political violence to the civil war, since
this serves only ‘to obscure . . . a programme of terror’.26
18 For the ‘praetorian’ traditions of Spanish politics see Stanley Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern
Spain (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), and Carolyn P. Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
19 The militarisation of Spanish policing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the central theme
of Ballbe´’s Orden pu´blico y militarismo.
20 Quoted in Manuel A´lvaro Duen˜as, ‘Los militares en la represio´n pol´ıtica de la posguerra: la
jurisdiccio´n especial de responsabilidades polı´ticas hasta la reforma de 1942’, Revista de Estudios Pol´ıticos,
69 (1990), 142.
21 For a stimulating comparative analysis see Voglis, Becoming a Subject, 22–6.
22 Eugenio Ferna´ndez Asiaı´n, El delito de rebelio´n militar (Madrid: Instituto Edit. Reus, 1943), 13.
23 Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 210–11.
24 Alberto Reig Tapia, Franco «Caudillo»:mito y realidad (Madrid: Tecnos, 1996), 191–2.
25 Casanova, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 51–119.
26 Michael Richards, ‘Civil War, Violence and the Construction of Francoism’, in Paul Preston
and Ann L. MacKenzie, eds, The Republic Besiegd: Civil War in Spain 1936–39 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
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This emphasis on ‘plans’ and ‘programmes of terror’ is reminiscent of the charges
laid against leading Nazis at Nuremberg in 1946.27 Indeed, Francisco Espinosa has
argued that the Franco regime is guilty of ‘genocide’ as defined by the Polish jurist
Raphael Lemkin and incorporated into international law in 1948 following the
Nuremberg trials – namely, the systematic destruction of national, racial, religious
or political groups.28 Denunciations of Francoist ‘genocide’ are also a feature of the
current political campaign for the formal legal rehabilitation and compensation to
victims of the Franco regime.29 In April 2004, for instance, the human rights group
Nizkor, with the support of sixteen other human rights and victims’ associations
issued a report, ‘The question of impunity in Spain and crimes under Franco’.
In its third section, entitled ‘The crimes of the Francoist repression form part of
the European context and the types of offences committed are determined by the
Nuremburg doctrine’, the authors highlight that the regime acted on ‘a plan of
extermination’.30
It is paradoxical that while discussion of Francoist ‘genocide’ takes Nuremburg as its
conceptual focus, historians of genocide have largely rejected mechanistic explanatory
models based on plans or programmes of destruction. Donald Bloxham, for example,
while dismissing Turkish denials that the Armenian genocide of 1915 and 1916 ever
took place, nevertheless contends that ‘there was no a priori blueprint for genocide’;
he points to a process of ‘cumulative policy radicalization’.31 In other words, Bloxham
argues that the ruling faction in the Ottoman government, the Committee of Union
and Progress, saw its Christian Armenian population as a threat to the territorial
integrity of the empire and an obstacle to the creation of an ethnically homogeneous
Turkish ‘national community’ before the First World War. Nevertheless, a genocidal
policy, causing the deaths of at least one million Armenians, was only adopted in
May 1915 in reaction to the course of the war and developing out of local initiatives
to resolve the ‘Armenian question’.32
It would be very difficult to claim that a similar process of ‘cumulative policy
radicalization’ occurred in Nationalist Spain after July 1936. Indeed, one could argue
that the exact opposite happened. This can be seen if we examine the number of
executions in Nationalist Spain during and after the civil war. Fortunately, we can
take advantage of the findings of over twenty years of detailed local research dedicated
University Press, 1996) 209, 239. See also his book, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression
in Franco’s Spain, 1936–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
27 The charges are discussed in detail in a contemporary account by Robert W. Cooper, The Nuremberg
Trial (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1947), 37–45.
28 Casanova, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 59.
29 This campaign has had some success. In September 2004 the current Spanish Prime Minister, the
Socialist Jose´ Luis Rodrı´guez Zapatero (the grandson of an army captain shot by the Nationalists in
August 1936), established an inter-ministerial commission to study the question of the rehabilitation of
victims of the Franco regime. BOE, 20 Sept. 2004.
30 The Nizkor report was accessed at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espan˜a/impuspa.html.
31 Donald Bloxham, ‘The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the
Development of a Destruction Policy’, Past and Present, 181 (Nov. 2003), 143.
32 Ibid., 186–91.
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to quantifying the number of victims. In April 1999, when a synthesis of this local
work was published, twenty-four provinces ( just under half but including the most
populous provinces) had been subject to a detailed investigation by local historians.33
Local studies, utilising a methodology that combines cemetery and death registers
with oral testimony, have demonstrated that general estimates of executions based
on contemporary anecdotal evidence are unreliable.34 Contemporary reports of
hundreds of thousands of executions, especially after the civil war, are exaggerated.35
This is above all true for the estimates contained in British diplomatic reports of the
1940s. For example, the British vice-consulate in San Sebastian reported in January
1945 that 4,586 executions had taken place in the Basque province of Guipu´zcoa since
1936.36 Recent research suggests 600.37 There is a general consensus that throughout
Spain around 100,000 executions had taken place by April 1939 as well as 50,000 after
the end of the civil war.38
As these figures imply, local research indicates the vital importance of chronology.
Executions were generally more frequent in those provinces under Nationalist control
from the summer of 1936 than those occupied near or at the end of the civil war,
irrespective of factors such as the political strength of Republican organisations. Thus
with the exception of Malaga (7,000 victims), provinces with over 6,000 executions
had been fully or partially occupied by Nationalist troops in 1936. These are Co´rdoba
(9,579), Seville (8,000), Badajoz (6,611) and Zaragoza (6,029).39 By contrast, none
of Spain’s most populous provinces - Barcelona (1,716), Madrid (3,113) and Valencia
(3,128) all occupied in 1939 – approach the 6,000 figure.40
In other words, local research indicates a correlation between the institutiona-
lisation of the Francoist ‘New State’ and a decline in the number of executions; the
bureaucratisation of the killing process produced fewer victims. Although Nationalist
Spain was officially under martial law from 28 July 1936, arbitrary murders – often
carried out by civilians and with the approval of the military authorities – were the
33 Julia´, Victimas, 411–12.
34 See Josep M. Sole´ ı´ Sabate, La repressio´ franquista a Catalunya 1938–1953 (Barcelona: Edicions 62,
1985), 19, for a discussion of the methodology.
35 See, e.g., the claim made in 1948 by Charles Foltz, an American journalist, that an ‘anonymous
official’ within the Justice Ministry had told him that 192,684 people were executed in Spain in the
period April 1939–June 1944. Charles Foltz, The Masquerade in Spain (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin,
1948), 97.
36 National Archives, Foreign Office General Correspondence, 49575, Document reference
Z1893/89/41.
37 Pedro Barruso, ‘La represio´n del republicanismo en Guipu´zcoa (1936–1945)’, in Cuadernos
Republicanos, 38 (1999), 72.
38 Casanova, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 8.
39 We should also probably add Granada to the list, as it is certain that the provincial minimum figure
of 5,048 victims is a serious underestimation. All these figures are listed in Julia´, Victimas, 411–12, with
the exception of that of Badajoz, which can be found in Francisco Espinosa, La columna de la muerte. El
avance del eje´rcito franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz (Madrid: Crı´tica, 2003).
40 Julia´ Victimas, except for Madrid, which is found in Julius Ruiz, ‘La Justicia Militar en Madrid
1939–1944. Justicia exterminadora?’, in Jose´ Manuel Chico Isidro, ed., Espan˜a en guerra. Protagonistas para
un conflicto (Madrid: Dykinson, 2003). Note that the figure for Madrid figure is a minimum, although it
is unlikely that the true figure will be significantly higher.
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norm in the summer of 1936.41 During this period military tribunals were primarily
reserved for leading military and political figures who did not accept the legality
of the rising.42 At least 433 people had been arbitrarily murdered by the time the
first military trial was held in Seville on 14 August 1936.43 The first defendant was
General Miguel Campins, military commandant in Granada, who had been less than
enthusiastic in his support for the military rising. His execution two days later reflected
the fragmented nature of military authority in the Nationalist zone – General Queipo
de Llano, the highest military authority in Andalucia, rejected a plea for clemency
by Campins’s personal friend, General Franco.44
However, the winter of 1936–7 saw the slow institutionalisation of military justice.
This partly reflected the general trend towards the centralisation of power in the
Nationalist zone following General Franco’s investiture as Commander-in-Chief of
the Nationalist army and head of state and the creation of a new administration, the
Junta Te´cnica, in October.45 It was also indicative of the widespread optimism, given
the rapid advances of the Army of Africa, that the fall of Madrid – and therefore
the possible end of the civil war – was imminent. Thus in November 1936 a decree
created a military legal column to direct the implementation of military justice in
‘liberated’ Madrid.46 When the failure to take the Spanish capital suggested that a
prolonged civil war was likely, a decree was issued in January 1937 ordering a rapid
extension of military justice throughout the Nationalist zone.47
Local studies have recorded the results of this process of institutionalisation in
the Nationalist zone. In Seville, judicial executions largely replaced arbitrary murder
from February 1937. In the period from July 1936 to February 1937, 3,028 executions
took place in the city; between February and October 1937, there were ‘only’ 137.48
Overall, for those provinces occupied by the Nationalists during the course of 1936,
the winter of 1936–7 was the watershed in terms of executions; indeed, only 10
to 20 per cent occurred after December 1936.49 Moreover, even provinces divided
into Republican and Nationalist areas during the civil war did not see a return to
the slaughter of 1936 after Franco’s unconditional victory in 1939. In Badajoz, for
example, where the eastern part of the province remained in Republican hands until
41 For a synopsis of this period see Julia´, Victimas, Part I, ch. II.
42 See, e.g., Juan Ortiz Villalba, Sevilla 1936: del golpe militar a la guerra civil (Co´rdoba: Imprenta
Vistalegre, 1998), ch. VI.
43 Alfonso Braojos et al. Sevilla, 36: sublevacio´n fascista y represio´n (Seville: Mun˜oz Moya y Montraveta
editores, 1990), 252–3.
44 Ortiz, Sevilla 1936. 190–5.
45 BOE. 2 Oct. 1936.
46 This consisted of eight military tribunals, sixteen examining magistrates and the Auditoria del
Eje´rcito de Ocupacio´n (Office of the Judge Advocacy General of the Army of Occupation), BOE.
5 Nov. 1936.
47 BOE, 26 Jan. 1937.
48 Braojos, Sevilla, 36, 252–7; 262.
49 Julia´, Victimas, 65.
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April 1939, executions in 1936 alone accounted for 79 per cent of the total of 6,610,
and executions after March 1939 for only 15.5 per cent.50
It is important to stress that institutionalisation does not mean that that the broad
objectives of the repression changed. As noted earlier, the military rebels in 1936 saw
themselves as the traditional defenders of Spain against ‘internal enemies’. General
Franco, when declaring martial law in Spanish Morocco on 18 July 1936, referred to
the need to re-establish ‘the principle of authority’.51 The restoration of ‘authority’
cost over 500 lives in Melilla alone during the summer of 1936.52
Yet the institutionalisation of the ‘New State’ meant that the restoration of ‘the
principle of authority’ could take forms other than execution. For example, it was
all too common in 1936 for Republican militiamen to be executed after capture.
As Colonel Yagu¨e infamously explained to the American journalist Jay Allen, the
executions of Republican militiamen in the Badajoz bullring in August 1936 were to
him unavoidable – ‘Was I supposed to turn them [the militiamen] loose in my rear
and let them make Badajoz red again?’53 However, in March 1937 Franco ordered
the creation of a regular concentration camp system in preparation for the northern
offensive on Vizcaya.54 These camps were to classify prisoners in three ways: suspected
‘red criminals’ were to be tried by military courts, ‘sympathisers’ of the Nationalists
were to be released (and generally later conscripted into the Nationalist army) and
the rest were to be classified as prisoners of war and used as forced labour.55 By the
end of 1937, 106,822 prisoners in more than sixty camps had been classified.56 Of
those, 59,000 POWs (55 per cent) were deemed ideologically reliable enough to fight
for Franco; 34,143 POWs (32 per cent) toiled in sixty-six militarised work battalions
throughout the Nationalist zone.57 According to the May 1937 decree that regulated
work battalions, forced labourers were given the ‘right-obligation’ to work. In other
words, they were given not only the right to take part in the material reconstruction
of Spain, but also the obligation, since as Republicans they were ‘guilty’ of causing
the civil war.58 In total, an estimated 507,000 Spaniards passed through Francoist
concentration camps before they were largely wound up by the end of 1940.59
This is not to say that we can draw a clear dividing line between ‘arbitrary’ and
‘institutional’ repression in 1937. After all, state-building in Nationalist Spain was a
slow exercise; the construction of the ‘New State’ only began with Franco’s accession
50 Espinosa, La columna de la muerte, 241.
51 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain (London: Pimlico, 1994), 60–1.
52 Casanova, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 63.
53 Quoted by Paul Preston, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Fontana Press, 1996),
89.
54 Javier Rodrigo, Los campos de concentracio´n franquistas, entre la historia y la memoria (Madrid: Siete
Mares, 2003), 62.
55 BOE, 11 March 1937.
56 Rodrigo, Los campos, 72, 214–15.
57 Ibid., 76–7, 130–1. Only 11 per cent were classified as suspected criminals.
58 BOE, 25 May 1937. Since working for the Francoist state was meant to be regarded as a ‘privilege’,
POWs classified as suspected criminals were excluded from work battalions.
59 Rodrigo, Los campos, 221.
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to power in October 1936 – the creation of a single party did not take place until
April 1937 and Franco did not appoint his first government until January 1938.60
The weakness of central authority in terms of dispensing ‘justice’ can clearly be
seen in the repression in Ma´laga following the occupation of the city in February
1937. The fledgling state was represented by the military legal column created for
Madrid in November 1936. However, its authority did not go uncontested by the
heterogeneous force that took the city. Apart from another military legal column
owing allegiance to General Queipo de Llano, Franco’s legal column had to face
claims of supreme authority by General Roatta, head of the Italian brigades. There
were also autonomous Falangist and Carlist militias operating the city.61 The jungle
of jurisdictions did not mitigate the repression in Ma´laga in any way: at least 3,027
were executed in the city by January 1938.62 Nor does it imply that the punishment
of ‘internal enemies’ in Ma´laga did not meet with Franco’s full approval: the Caudillo
rejected Italian appeals to intervene on behalf of those condemned to death.63
But by the end of the civil war in 1939, military justice was the principal source
of executions. Not all extra-judicial killings ceased, especially during the chaotic
first weeks of the post-civil war period. Irregular executions undoubtedly took
place, for example, in rural areas immediately following occupation in 1939. Los
Pedroches, a district of northern Co´rdoba that had remained Republican throughout
the civil war, witnessed at least sixty arbitrary murders in April 1939.64 Yet there
is little evidence indicating the existence of a stable, parallel, ‘unofficial’ system of
extrajudicial executions after the civil war. While those arbitrarily murdered do not
leave a trail of paper, they do leave their remains. Our knowledge of the location
of Nationalist common graves has been immeasurably enhanced by the activities of
the Asociacio´n para la Recuperacio´n de la Memoria Histo´rica (Association of the
Recovery of Historic Memory – ARMH). This grassroots organisation was created
in March 2000 by Emilio Silva and Santiago Macı´as to identify and excavate the
sites of mass graves of victims of the Franco regime.65 Their work has confirmed
the essential distinction between the civil war and post-civil war repression. Of the
seventeen mass graves located by the ARMH throughout Spain that have yet to be
exhumed, only two date from the period after March 1939. Moreover, on reading
the testimony of victims’ relatives, it becomes apparent that they had been tried and
sentenced to death by a military tribunal.66
60 For a general account of this state-building process see Payne, Franco Regime, 163–96.
61 Ignacio Arenillas de Chaves, Marque´s de Gracia Real, El proceso del Besteiro (Madrid: Revista de
Occidente, 1976). Arenillas served in the legal column created for the occupation of Madrid in November
1936 throughout the civil war.
62 For the repression in Ma´laga see Antonio Nadal, Guerra civil en Ma´laga (Ma´laga: Arguval, 1984), and
Encarnacio´n Barranquero Texeira, Ma´laga entre la guerra y la posguerra (Ma´laga: Arguval, 1994).
63 John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975), 191–2.
64 Julia´, Victimas, 334.
65 Emilio Silva and Santiago Macı´as, Las fosas de Franco (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2003).
66 Ibid., 285–303.
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Given that military tribunals were punishing Republicans for ‘rebellion’, the fact
that ‘only’ 50,000 executions took place after the civil war does not necessarily indicate
the absence of an extermination policy. For Francisco Espinosa, the development of
the military justice system was simply an attempt by the Franco regime to cover up
its ‘serious crimes . . .with the appearance of legality. It was only a case of keeping up
appearances’.67 In a similar vein, Francisco Moreno has dismissed military trials as ‘a
mere step [tra´mite] to physical elimination’.68
Clearly, a thorough examination of military justice after the civil war is necessary.
Was it simply a matter of ‘keeping up appearances’? Was death the most likely
outcome of a military trial? The task is made more difficult by the dearth of
detailed research, which partly reflects the long-standing problems of access to the
military archives.69 Admission is now at least possible, although it is still restricted
and documents remain largely uncatalogued.70 Given these continuing problems,
some historians have understandably chosen to seek out and analyse the case files of
prominent Republicans sentenced to death after the civil war. Thus we are better
informed about the circumstances of the executions of the president of the Catalan
Generalitat, Lluis Companys, in 1940 and the anarchist leader Joan Peiro´ in 1942
among others.71 Yet it is of course impossible to generalise about the ‘exterminatory’
nature of military justice from such cases. Mirta Nu´n˜ez’s claim that those given prison
sentences were ‘survivors who had managed to free themselves from death sentences’
is at the very least questionable, given that her own work in the Madrid military
archive has concentrated almost exclusively on cases ending with a death sentence.72
The few studies that have examined a broader range of military sentences would
indicate that the term ‘survivor’ is a rather misleading one to apply to those who
escaped a firing squad. Manuel Ortiz, whose research on military justice in the
province of Albacete is based on sentences found in defendants’ prison files, estimates
that only 3 per cent of military sentences resulted in execution. The most common
outcome was a prison term ranging from twelve years and a day to twenty years.73
My own research on military justice in Madrid, based on sentences remitted to the
Law of Political Responsibilities (LPR) authorities created in February 1939, has
67 Casanova, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 58 (emphasis in original).
68 Julia´, Victimas, 321.
69 Alberto Reig Tapı´a, Ideologı´a e historia: sobre la represio´n franquista y la guerra civil (Madrid: Akal, 1984),
23–4.
70 For a recent discussion of the general state of access to the archives see Manel Risques, ‘Archivos y
fuentes documentales del mundo concentracionario y penitenciario espan˜ol’, in Molinero, Una inmensa
prisı´on.
71 Josep Benet, La mort del president Companys (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1998); Albert Balcells ‘El
consejo de guerra contra el dirigente cenetista catala´n Joan Peiro´ en 1942’, Hispania NovaI : Revista de
Historia Contempora´nea 2 (2001–2), at http://hispanianova.rediris.es
72 The quotation is given in the prologue to Rafael Torres, Los esclavos de Franco (Madrid: Oberon,
2001), 8. Mirta Nu´n˜ez Dı´az-Balart and Andre´s Rojas Friend, Consejo de guerra. Los fusilamientos en el
Madrid de la posguerra (1939–45) (Madrid: Compan˜ı´a Literaria, 1997).
73 Manuel Ortiz Heras, Violencia politica en la II Repu´blica y el primer franquismo (Madrid: Siglo XXI,
1996), 370–1.
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brought me to a similar conclusion.74 Out of over 20,000 sentences held within the
LPR collection in the state archive of Alcala´ de Henares near Madrid, I selected
a sample of 947 convictions from the period March 1939 to December 1942. The
sample indicates that in Madrid prison sentences of eight to twelve years and a
day were most common, followed by sentences of fourteen to thirty years.75 In
other words, although extremely harsh, the military sentencing policy was not
exterminatory.
So why were some sentenced to death but not others? Social class is undoubtedly a
significant factor. Research indicates that post-civil war victims of the Franco regime
tended to have working-class or peasant backgrounds. In Alicante, Albacete and
Madrid, for example, over two-thirds of those shot were workers or peasants.76 It is
also appears that villages were most affected; in Barcelona, the repression was harsher
in surrounding rural areas than the Catalan capital itself.77 In Madrid, my analysis of
over 3,100 death sentences issued in the province between March 1939 and February
1944 shows that peasants were far less likely than any other social group – including
workers – to have their sentences commuted.78 Yet no conclusive evidence has been
produced to indicate that social class was the determining factor in postwar executions.
The fact that, for instance, a sample of 166 acquittals in Madrid shows that the
majority of those exonerated also had peasant or working-class backgrounds indicates
that a broad generalisation based on quantitative data is not an adequate substitute
for detailed case analysis.79 That Francoist military tribunals punished peasants or
workers is unquestioned; whether they were exterminated is another matter.
Despite the great volume of research that has been carried out on the post-civil
war repression, there has been very little detailed examination of the specific criteria
employed by military tribunals when sentencing defendants to death. This article
necessarily relies on my own analysis of death sentences issued in Madrid. Of course,
there is the danger that Madrid is unrepresentative of the rest of Spain. It is the case
that the Franco regime regarded Madrid as particularly ‘red’ in 1939. So ‘red’ in
fact that there were serious discussions as to whether it should remain the Spanish
capital at all. Discussions of alternative, more ‘Spanish’ candidates, that apparently
included Seville and Valladolid, took place at governmental level throughout 1939.80
74 This law, which demanded economic reparation from those ‘guilty’ of causing the civil war,
stipulated that all those condemned by a military tribunal be subject to a Law of Political Responsibilities
investigation. Art. 4(a), BOE, 13 Feb. 1939.
75 The full results can be found in Ruiz, ‘La Justicia Militar’, 105.
76 Miguel Ors Montengro, La represio´n de guerra y posguerra en Alicante (1936–45) (Alicante: Instituto de
Cultura Juan Gil-Albert, 1995), 303–4; Ortiz, Violencia pol´ıtica 290; Ruiz, ‘La Justicia Militar’, 99.
77 Sole´ ı´ Sabate, La repressio´, 10.
78 Most, but not all these sentences can be found in the aforementioned LPR collection in the Archivo
General de la Administracio´n (AGA), Alcala´ de Henares. Ruiz, ‘La Justicia Militar’, 99.
79 This sample was chosen from among the sentences located in the AGA. The full results were
working-class/peasants: eighty-eight (53 per cent), middle-class/professional: seventy-eight (47 per cent).
80 Manuel Valde´s Larran˜aga, De la Falange al Movimiento (1936–1952) (Madrid: Fundacio´n Nacional
Francisco Franco, 1994), 118–19. Valde´s was the first Falangist chief in Madrid after the civil war, and
then under-secretary in the labour ministry from August 1939. See also Serrano, Entre el silencio, 247–8.
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The idea was abandoned only after opposition from the military, which stressed
Madrid’s imperial past.81
Although Madrid’s ‘red’ reputation was partly based on the tenacity of resistance
by the city’s Republican defenders from the winter of 1936–1937, it mainly derived
from the murder of perhaps as many as 8,815 suspected Nationalist sympathisers
during the civil war.82 Indeed, death sentences issued in Madrid after March 1939
suggest the importance of memories of the so-called ‘red terror’ and the desire to
avenge Republican ‘crimes of blood’.
To state that there exists a relationship between Republican murders and post-civil
war executions does not imply an acceptance of Francoist propaganda. Given that
Republicans were being punished for ‘military rebellion’, the regime’s claims that
only those with ‘blood on their hands’ should fear Francoist justice are untenable.
Defendants had little opportunity to defend themselves against the accusations made
against them. In post-civil war Madrid, as elsewhere in Spain, defendants were
generally tried collectively after having only been given access to a lawyer (who was
always a military officer) hours before trial.83
Above all, such a stance does not imply that executions after March 1939were non-
political. Ex-Republican ministers or prominent Popular Front leaders unfortunate
enough to fall into the claws of Francoist military justice rarely escaped a death penalty
for their responsibility in furthering the ‘military rebellion’. In July 1942, Joan Peiro´,
the anarchist Industry Minister in the Largo Caballero government of 1936–1937,
was tried and shot in Valencia (seat of the Republican government in 1936–1937)
rather than in Barcelona (his political power base and where he was accused, unjustly,
of ‘blood crimes’).84
On a more local level, military tribunals often held Republican leaders responsible
for ‘blood crimes’ committed in neighbourhoods under their formal responsibility,
irrespective of whether they had participated in – or opposed – such murders. Thus
Pedro Gonza´lez Gonza´lez, mayor of Legane´s (a town 12 kilometres south of Madrid)
in the summer of 1936, was sentenced to death in November 1939 for the arrest and
subsequent murder of a local Augustinian monk by ‘outside militias’. He was shot in
Madrid in June 1940, despite the fact that the military tribunal accepted that he had
aided other Augustinians as well as known right-wingers.85
More generally, Republican murders served to intensify the conflation of
criminality and ‘anti-Spain’ and ‘anti-Spanish’ ideas. The Bello´n commission report of
February 1939 into the ‘illegality’ of the Republic emphasised how the ‘over 500,000’
81 Santos Julia´ et al. Madrid. Historia de una capital (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1994), 431.
82 For the figure cited above see Rafael Casas de la Vega, El Terror: Madrid 1936. Investigacio´n histo´rica
y cata´logo de vı´ctimas identificadas (Madrid: Fe´nix, 1994), 21–2. Although Casas, an ex-Francoist general,
maintains that we should treat his figure as a minimum, Javier Cervera has pointed out errors and
duplications in his lists of victims. Javier Cervera, Madrid en guerra. La ciudad clandestina 1936–1939 (Madrid:
Alianza Editorial, 1998), 88–9.
83 Julia´, Victimas, 316–22.
84 Balcells, ‘El consejo de guerra’.
85 AGA (Alcala´ de Henares), Justicia, Fondo Responsabilidades Pol´ıticas, legajo 468 (henceforth AGA,
J(RP) 468).
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murders in the Republican zone confirmed the ‘criminal’ nature of the Spanish left.
This was also the conclusion of an internal military report from 1938 detailing ‘red
crimes’. It explained that ‘only Marxist doctrine . . . could have produced in Spain,
after years of tolerated preparation, the awful havoc represented by the poisoning and
subversion of so many consciences and conducts, turning respectable citizens into
barbarous criminals’.86
Nevertheless, we cannot interpret any relationship between ‘blood crimes’ and
post-civil war executions as merely (to use Francisco Espinosa’s phrase) ‘keeping up
appearances’. My work on Madrid indicates that sentencing was far too varied to
suggest a uniform extermination policy based on political background. Why is it, for
example, that when the entire Republican leadership of the village of Valdepielagos
(Madrid) was put on trial in Colmenar Viejo on 22 July 1939, only two death
sentences were issued, against the local councillor Victoriano Gonza´lez Anton and
the local president of the socialist trade union, the UGT? Both were accused of the
murder of the local Falangist leader, Jose´ Fuentes, in 1936. The others, including
the Communist mayor Cecilio Calleja, received prison sentences for the confiscation
of property.87 Furthermore, how can we explain away the fact that in Madrid, an
active Popular Front political background alone was sometimes not enough even to
secure a conviction, let alone a death sentence? Francisco Figuerola Torres was found
not guilty of ‘military rebellion’ by a Madrid military tribunal in June 1939, despite
being a member of the Socialist Party and secretary of the UGT branch in the state
communications company, Telefo´nica.88
The absence of a post-civil war extermination policy can be also demonstrated by
an examination of why mass executions declined. Curiously, while so much effort
has been expended in explaining why mass executions took place in Francoist Spain,
the question of why they decreased has not received much consideration. It is only
in a footnote in Richards’s study of Francoist Spain, for example, that he asserts that
Francoist policy was modified ‘in October 1945 under pressure from the Allied victors
after the end of the SecondWorld War’.89 Other historians also place emphasis on the
Second World War, although the change in policy is dated earlier – usually at 1942–3
following the Allied landings in north Africa under Operation Torch in September
1942 and the fall of Mussolini in July 1943.90 The assumption is, however, the same –
Francoist policy was determined by external events; ‘extermination’ would have
continued but for the likelihood and ultimately the reality of Allied victory.
The results of local research do not support either 1942–3 or 1945 as the turning
point. Rather, it appears that mass executions had largely come to an end by 1941.
86 Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Espan˜ola (Salamanca), Delegacio´n Nacional del Servicio de
Documentos (Presidencia), legajo 35. The report, entitled ‘The First Provisional Catalogue of Red
Crimes’, was produced in summer or autumn 1938 by the army information service.
87 AGA, J(RP) 356. The death sentences of both men were commuted in October 1939.
88 AGA, J(RP) 30387.
89 Richards, Time of Silence, 223.
90 See Helmut Heine, ‘Tipologı´a y caracterı´sticas de la represio´n y violencia pol´ıticas durante el perı´odo
1939–1961’, in Javier Tusell et al. La oposicio´n al re´gimen de Franco (Madrid: UNED, 1990), 312.
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Thus, for instance, the biennium 1939 to 1940 accounts for 72.5 per cent of all
executions in Madrid, 74.2 per cent in Levante and 84.5 per cent in Barcelona.91 In
other words, we should be considering internal not external factors, in particular,
the crisis that had enveloped military justice by 1940. What will be suggested is that
from 1940 the Franco regime, far from implementing an exterminatory policy, was
in fact winding up the whole process of mass military justice.
Before discussing the nature of the post-civil war crisis, we need to examine briefly
the bureaucratic structure of military justice. Given that the military’s established role
was the protection of Spain against its external and internal enemies, the main
institutional features of the Francoist military justice system were in place before
the civil war. Indeed, the Military Justice Code that provided the procedures that
regulated the activities of Francoist military tribunals dated from 1890.92 A key feature
of the code was the autonomy it gave to a military tribunal when sentencing.93 All
individuals condemned by a military tribunal were found guilty of a legal form
of military rebellion. The most serious, carrying the death penalty or thirty years’
imprisonment, was ‘adhesion to the rebellion’.94 The only check on military tribunal
autonomy in the 1890 Military Justice Code was the judge advocate (auditor de
guerra).95 All sentences issued by military tribunals were provisional until the highest
territorial military authority (for example an army group commander) confirmed or
rejected them. In practice, the latter acted on the advice of his legal advisor, the judge
advocate, who would examine the sentence first to ensure that the military tribunal
had acted in accordance with military law and the evidence presented in the case file.
But even if these higher authorities disagreed with a military tribunal, they could not
overturn the sentence and impose another one; instead, the case would have to be
sent to the Military Supreme Court for a retrial and a definitive decision.96
However, the mass expansion of Francoist military justice after July 1936, and the
necessarily ill-defined nature of the crime of ‘rebellion’, reinforced military tribunal
autonomy at the expense of the centre. Given that anyone in the Republican zone
was potentially guilty of ‘rebellion’, hundreds of thousands of military investigations
were opened during, and especially after, the civil war. While it is impossible to give
an exact figure, an indication of its likely scale can be deduced from the fact that in
Granada alone, following the complete occupation of the province at the end of the
91 Nun˜ez and Rojas, Consejo, 109, 113; Vicent Gabarda, Els afusellaments al paı´s Valencia´ (1938–1956)
(Valencia: Edicions El Magna´nim,1993), 74; Sole´ ı´ Sabate, La repressio´, 9.
92 It was not replaced until July 1945. BOE, 20 July 1945.
93 Arts. 172 and 173 not only gave tribunals the right to promulgate sentences that they considered
‘just’ but also the ability to determine a sentence based on whether there were any ‘attenuating’ or
‘aggravating’ factors in the case.
94 Arts. 238–241, 252.
95 Defendants could only appeal if they could demonstrate that the evidence used to convict them was
unsound (Art. 678). However, Franco withdrew this limited right of appeal in November 1936; BOE,
23 Nov. 1936.
96 Art. 597.
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civil war, twenty-eight military tribunals worked round the clock in 1939 to hear the
approximately 60,000 cases that had been opened.97
The merciless logic of Francoist military justice also ensured the systematic
punishment of Francoist sympathisers unfortunate enough to have remained in the
Republican zone throughout the civil war. One striking example is Julia´n Vidal
Torres, the first Nationalist civil governor of Guadalajara in March 1939. Vidal, a
lawyer, worked as a prosecutor in a Republican military tribunal in Madrid during
the civil war. However, he was also an agent for the Nationalist military information
service, SIPM, and attempted to sabotage the work of the military tribunal. By
March 1939 he had become leader of a clandestine Falangist group in Guadalajara,
and he negotiated the peaceful surrender of the province with the local Republican
commander. Nevertheless, because he had served on a Republican military tribunal,
he was deemed to have aided the ‘rebels’, and was given a twelve-year prison sentence
in June 1941.98
Not surprisingly, the legal section of the Nationalist army, the Military Juridical
Corps, was massively expanded tomeet the self-created demand for punishing ‘rebels’.
Conscription of lawyers was in place as early as November 1936.99 From 1937, any
ideologically ‘reliable’ individuals with knowledge of law were liable for service in
the Military Juridical Corps.100 It was not uncommon, especially in rural areas such
as Co´rdoba, for defendants accused of ‘blood crimes’ to find that they were being
investigated by the victims’ families.101 So given the explosion of military cases and
the mass recruitment of civilian personnel often ignorant of military procedures, the
actual implementation of military justice, far from being a ‘mechanical’ exercise of
state terror, could often be extremely chaotic.102 Jose´ Me´ndez Leyra, a twenty-year-
old shop assistant, was sentenced to death on 9 November 1939 for taking part in
‘blood crimes’ in Madrid. However, due to a clerical error his case file was then
misplaced. Because of the constant changes of court personnel, the error was not
recognised until October 1942. Me´ndez was finally reprieved on 30 May 1943.103
Moreover, the chaotic application of military justice was accompanied by a lack of
central control. This is not to suggest that this mitigated its severity. When military
jurisdiction was massively expanded after July 1936, no specific guidelines were issued
to relate newly created ‘crimes’ to pre-existing legal definitions of military rebellion
listed in the 1890 Military Justice Code. In this situation, military tribunals were
97 Rafael Gil Bracero, ‘La Justicia National y el Tribunal de Responsabilidades Pol´ıticas de Granada:
las fuentes y primeras conclusiones’, in Justicia en guerra (Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia, 1990), 606. Since
some military cases were collective, the actual number of people tried was even higher.
98 AGA, J(RP) 524.
99 BOE, 11 Nov. 36.
100 Mo´nica Lanero Ta´boas, Una milicia de la justicia. La pol´ıtica judicial del franquismo (1936–1945) (Madrid:
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1996), 362–3.
101 Julia´, Victimas, 318.
102 The end of the civil war saw the proliferation of military manuals designed to explain military
justice procedures to legal conscripts. One such guide, Manual de Justicia Militar, written by a member of
Franco’s own legal staff, Commandant Rafael Dı´az-Llanos Lecuona, went through six editions by 1941.
103 AGA, J(RP) 1067.
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dependent on the periodic issuing of guidance from the Military Supreme Court.
These instructions were so broad as to be almost meaningless. InMarch 1937 a circular
explained the offences of ‘adhesion to the rebellion’ (which potentially meant death)
and ‘help to the rebellion’ (a maximum twenty-year prison sentence). For the former,
the defendant ‘not only aids or co-operates with the rebellion, but identifies with its
objectives . . . and is united in spirit with the rebels’.104 Legal generalities therefore
put military tribunals in a powerful position to formulate their own interpretation
of precisely what constituted the different legal kinds of military rebellion. The only
curb on military tribunals, the judge advocates, turned out to be an insufficient means
of control because of the sheer number of cases. In November 1939 a decree doubled
the number of judge advocates in order to centralise the implementation of military
justice.105
In other words, military tribunals did not act upon specific orders from above
when sentencing. The extent to which sentencing varied from tribunal to tribunal
can be illustrated by comparing two sentences issued on the same day, 3 July 1939,
by different military tribunals in Madrid province. The military tribunal in Alcala´ de
Henares handed down a thirty-year prison sentence for ‘adhesion to the rebellion’ to
Pedro Ayra, a pre-civil war member of the liberal Izquierda Republicana. Although
the military tribunal considered it to be proved that Ayra had been a member of the
revolutionary committee in the nearby village of Torrejo´n de Ardoz during the civil
war, it rejected accusations that he had taken part in any crimes committed in the
village, noting his ‘moderate behaviour’.106 By contrast, Petra Martı´nez, the leader
of the Communist Party’s Women’s Section in Torrejo´n de Ardoz, received a prison
sentence of six years and a day for the lesser offence of ‘incitement to the rebellion’
from a military tribunal in the capital. This is despite the fact that the military tribunal
noted with disapproval that she took part in propaganda activities and the confiscation
of property.107
Of course, the chaotic, decentralised nature of military justice does not preclude
extermination; it might be argued that military tribunals had simply internalised
Francoist exterminatory ideology, making orders from above unnecessary. After all,
policy making in Nazi Germany became increasingly fragmented and radicalised
during the 1930s as competing state and party agencies ‘worked towards the
Fu¨hrer’.108 Nevertheless, in Francoist Spain the consequence of the chaotic nature
of military justice would not be the ‘cumulative radicalisation’ of policy; rather,
by the winter of 1939–40, the regime wished to reassert central control over the
punishment of civil war ‘crimes’ in order to tackle the growing crisis of the military
justice system. Tellingly, the preamble of the aforementioned November 1939 decree
104 Ferna´ndez, El delito, 55–6.
105 BOE, 11 Nov. 1939.
106 AGA, J(RP) 392.
107 AGA, J(RP) 841.
108 For the concept of ‘working towards the Fu¨hrer’ see the two-volume biography of Hitler by Ian
Kershaw, Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris (London: Allen Lane, 1998), and Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis (London:
Allen Lane, 2000).
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talked of the need for greater centralisation in order to ‘liquidate rapidly this important
problem’.109 The ‘problem’ was the logical consequence of Francoist military justice:
overcrowded prisons and thousands of unresolved investigations. In the capital, there
were probably 50,000 prisoners.110 According to the regime itself in 1951, there were
only 20,000 prison places available nationally in 1939.111
But how was this ‘problem’ to be addressed? For the Franco regime, liquidation
was not a euphemism for genocide; rather, it was a signal that the whole process
of mass military justice was to be discontinued. Central to this policy was the order
issued by Franco’s personal department, the Presidencia de Gobierno on 25 January
1940.112 This codified the crime of military rebellion in the context of the civil war.
Its aim was to eliminate ‘inequalities that may have occurred and have occurred in
many cases, given . . . the lack of uniformity of criteria to judge and punish similar
crimes of equal seriousness’. The order established, in an annexe, eighty-two different
types of ‘rebellion’, divided into six general groups.113 The predominance of ‘blood
crimes’ among the most serious offences is clear. Thirteen of the seventeen offences
listed as warranting an automatic death penalty are for participation in murders.
However, the vague wording of many listed offences in the annexe is also apparent.
Although membership of a Popular Front organisation is not specifically listed as
‘rebellion’, individuals could be sentenced to twenty years and a day for having
been ‘agitators or propagandists of the Marxist or revolutionary parties against the
Movement’.114 Therefore the significance of the annexe lies not in the text alone
but in how the regime wanted it to be interpreted. The other sections of the order
imply that military tribunals had generally been too harsh in sentencing. Article 1
established in every province a revision commission to re-examine in the light of the
new sentencing criteria all sentences imposed prior to the issuing of the order. They
were forbidden to recommend sentences higher than those originally imposed.115
The January 1940 order, then, effectively ended the autonomy of military tribunals.
Judge advocates could reduce the length of a sentence with reference to the annexe
without referring the case to the Military Supreme Court. In March 1940 a Madrid
military tribunal sentenced Eladio Campeno, an ex-Popular Front councillor and
leading trade unionist in the village of Torrelaguna, to thirty years’ imprisonment.
109 BOE, 11 Nov. 1939.
110 Jose´ E. Leiva, En nombre de Dios, de Espan˜a y de Franco. Memorias de un condenado a muerte (Buenos
Aires: Unio´n Socialista Libertaria, 1948), 165.
111 Francisco Aylagas, El re´gimen penitenciario espan˜ol (Madrid, 1951), 85, quoted by Vinyes, ‘El universo
penitenciario’, 161.
112 BOE, 26 Jan. 1940.
113 This annexe, despite its importance, remains unpublished. An abridged version can be found in Jose´
M. Sabı´n, Prisio´n y muerte en la Espan˜a de postguerra (Madrid: Anaya & Mario Muchnik, 1996).
114 Group 3, No. 9.
115 Art. 3. The revision commissions would make their recommendations – based solely on an
examination of the sentence – to the relevant higher juridical military authorities, which then took
the final decision.
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The judge advocate reduced this to twelve years and a day. By January 1944Campeno
was out of prison.116
Crucially, the January 1940 order also reduced the likelihood of executions. My
work on death sentences in Madrid suggests that from after 1941 over 50 per cent
ended with a commutation. In the vast majority of such cases, the judge advocate
had previously recommended a commutation on the argument that, according to the
criteria established in January 1940, the evidence of participation in ‘blood crimes’
was insufficient to warrant the death penalty.117 The sense that January 1940 marked
a crucial turning point in the post-civil war repression can be seen in the following
case from Madrid. In April 1939 Carmen Rodrı´guez was sentenced to death for
being an agent of the Republican military security service, the SIM. The sentence
was approved by Franco but suspended pending investigation into the SIM’s activities
against the clandestine fifth column. When her case was re-examined by the judge
advocate in 1941, he recommended that the sentence be commuted on the basis of
the January 1940 order. In January 1942 Rodrı´guez’s sentence was revised to twenty
years’ imprisonment.118
It must be stressed that the January 1940 order marked the beginning and not
the end of the process of winding up mass military justice. It would prove to
be a protracted exercise. This was partly because of the severity of the crisis. On
29 October 1940 the director-general of prisons, Ma´ximo Cuervo, informed Franco
that Spanish prisons held 106,130 inmates convicted by military tribunals, including
8,340 condemned to death. However, there were 33,896 prisoners with unconfirmed
sentences and 94,286 who were still awaiting trial.119 However, there was much
bureaucratic inertia. Although the work of the sentence revision commissions was
accorded the highest priority, the process of reducing sentences imposed in 1939
was painfully slow. Sometimes the delay was simply too long. The Republican poet
Miguel Herna´ndez, sentenced to death in January 1940 but reprieved the following
June, had his sentence revised again to twenty years and a day by a revision commission
in October 1944. Herna´ndez had already died in Alicante jail, in March 1942.120
It also appears that the revision commissions – composed of military lawyers – were
slow to appreciate the objective of their work. On 15 March 1940, the Air Minister,
General Yagu¨e, reported to Franco on the progress made by the commission dealing
with sentences involving airmen.121 The person responsible for the massacre of
militiamen in the Badajoz bullring in August 1936 complained that the Commission’s
recommendations were generally ‘too harsh’, and did not formulate its decisions on
‘the necessity to resolve the general penitentiary problem in harmony with national
needs’. These complaints about the failures of the military bureaucracy were echoed
116 AGA, J(RP) 1394.
117 Ruiz, ‘Justicia Militar’, 98.
118 AGA, J(RP) 1094. For the fifth column in Madrid see Cervera, Madrid en guerra.
119 Documentos Ine´ditos para la Historia del Generalisimo Franco (Madrid: Fundacio´n Nacional Francisco
Franco, 1992) (hereafter FNFF, Documentos), vol. 2(i), 386–7.
120 Juan Guerrero Zamora, Proceso a Miguel Herna´ndez. El sumario 21.001 (Madrid: Dossat, 1990), 106.
121 AGA, P 4036.
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by Cuervo in a report to Franco in May 1940. He admitted that ‘the laws dictated in
the last months . . . have been less effective than they should have been’. He held the
Military Juridical Corps responsible, since it failed to recognise ‘the extremely grave
problem that it has in its hands and the pressing and serious need to bring to an end
its liquidation’.122
However, the period 1941–3 marks the decisive period of the Franco regime’s
policy of winding up mass military justice. In 1941 the process of shelving incomplete
military investigations, begun in the spring of 1940, was accelerated.123 Paroled
inmates increasingly joined those who left prison without trial. Prisoners became
eligible en masse following an April 1941 decree that ordered the release of anyone
sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment or less for civil war offences.124 This
threshold was increased to twenty years in March 1943,125 and finally in December
1943 extended to those prisoners with sentences up to and including the maximum,
thirty years, providing that they were not authors or instigators of ‘blood crimes’.126
All individuals convicted of civil war offences, except those excluded for parole for
‘blood crimes’, were pardoned by decree in October 1945.127
The effects of the regime’s parole policy on the prison population can be seen
in the following internal figures compiled by the Justice Ministry in the 1940s. In
1941, 47,234 prisoners had been paroled, in 1942, 29,353, and in 1943, 57,549. In
1944 and 1945 only 24,721 and 9,860 civil war prisoners respectively were released,
suggesting the belated effectiveness of the revision commissions in reducing even the
longest prison sentences issued in 1939.128 Thus Allied victory in the Second World
War marked not the beginning but essentially the end of the Franco regime’s parole
policy; by February 1952 only 829 were still serving sentences for civil war offences
in Spain.129
This is not to suggest that the ending of mass repression in the early 1940s was
ever based on reconciliation. The last death sentence by a military tribunal for civil
war ‘crimes of blood’ was issued as late as April 1963 against the Communist leader
Julia´n Grimau.130 The regime never substantially altered its ideological vision of the
civil war presented by Serrano Sun˜er’s commission in February 1939. In July 1965,
Franco reminded his cousin, Franco Salgado, that the military rose in July 1936 to
‘save Spain from chaos’.131 The preamble of the 1969 decree that finally proscribed
all civil war offences still referred to the conflict as the Guerra de Liberacio´n.132
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The regime also continued to conflate political opposition with disorder and
criminality. It would ruthlessly eliminate clandestine anti–Francoist political activity
until the dictator’s death in 1975. In response to the activities of the Communist-
led guerrilla movement, the Maquis, the regime issued a law against ‘banditry
and terrorism’ in April 1947.133 The charge of ‘military rebellion’ would remain
a favoured means of punishing political dissidence. In 1974–5, at least 305
civilians appeared before military tribunals accused of ‘insulting’ the armed forces,
‘disobedience’ towards a military authority or threatening the security of the state.134
From December 1963 the work of military tribunals was buttressed by the creation
of a special civil court, the Public Order Tribunal (TOP). Its task was to punish those
who ‘subvert the basic principles of the state, disturb public order or sow unease in
the national conscience’.135 In 1974–5, 2,291 cases were opened by the TOP.136 So
although from the early 1940s the regime no longer demanded that criminal and
political ‘responsibilities’ arising from the civil war be punished, it expected passive,
if not active, acquiescence.
The coexistence of mass parole of civil war prisoners and vigorous suppression
of political opposition in 1940s Spain is not unique. It anticipated – on a much
greater scale – the ‘normalisation’ that took place at the end of the Greek civil war
in 1949. Following the defeat of the communist guerrillas by the US-backed right-
wing government, a series of decrees reduced the number of political prisoners from
40-50,000 to 4,458 by 1955.137 Yet the Greek authorities always denied that a civil
war had taken place, preferring to see it as a ‘bandit war’.138
If the ending of mass repression after the Spanish civil war is not unique, neither is it
meaningless. The release of tens of thousands of prisoners in the early 1940s fits ill with
the argument that for the Franco regime ‘the Spanish working classes becamewhat the
Jews were to that other, more notoriously renowned Volksgemeinschaft’.139 In any
case, one does not have to believe in Francoist ‘plans’ or ‘blueprints’ of extermination
to argue that the military rebellion of July 1936 was concerned with protecting Spain
from ‘internal enemies’ such as left-wing Popular Front organisations and Catalan
and Basque nationalists. Given the established tradition of military intervention in
civilian affairs, the military rebels saw themselves as re-establishing ‘the principle of
authority’. In the context of the failure of the rebels to take control of the Republican
state, and the fragmentation of power in the Nationalist zone, the re-establishment
of ‘the principle of authority’ often meant the physical elimination of ‘internal
133 Ballbe´, Orden, 421. The best general account of the Maquis that makes use of recent research is
Secundino Serrano, Maquis. Historia de la guerra antifranquista (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2001). Serrano
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135 BOE, 5 Dec. 1963.
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enemies’ in summer 1936. However, the institutionalisation of the Nationalist state
from the winter of 1936–7 meant that the restoration of ‘the principle of authority’
increasingly acquired a different meaning. Instead of being arbitrarily murdered,
‘internal enemies’, especially those suspected of ‘blood crimes’ in the Republican
zone, were punished by military tribunals for the crime of ‘military rebellion’. By
1940, it was the crisis of mass military justice that challenged the ‘principle of
authority’ and the regime opted to bring to an end the whole process of punishing
civil war crimes. In other words, while the broad objective of the repression remained
constant, the context in which it was pursued changed radically after July 1936.
Exterminatory interpretations, based essentially on the bloody summer of 1936,
distort our understanding of the dynamic nature of the repressive process.
